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TITLE VII RETALIATION, A UNIQUE BREED
DAVID ANTHONY RUTTER*

Ask an average employee whether her employer can fire her because of
her gender or the color of her skin and she will probably say no. She
probably thinks that her private employer cannot discriminate against her
because it would violate her constitutional rights.
Thus, employees are generally aware that they have some rights.' The
source of protection for employees in the private sector comes from Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 2 Title VII prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees because of their race, color, religion,
sex or national origin. 3 A lesser known, although equally important section
of Title VII, intended to serve as a guardian over the anti-discrimination
section of Title VII, is the anti-retaliation section of Title VII. 4 Normally, an
employer has considerable control over its employees' employment
conditions, benefits, and career advancement. Congress was concerned
when it introduced Title VII that employers might misuse that authority in
order to create a chilling effect and thereby inhibit the effectiveness of the
anti-discrimination section of Title V1I

5

Employees are not likely to attempt

to exercise their rights under the anti-discrimination section of Title VII if
they know that they face termination or other punishments from their
employer in retaliation. To deter such employer conduct, and to encourage
employees

to

come

forth

with

legitimate

discrimination

complaints,

Congress included in Title VII an anti-retaliation section that prohibits

* Dave Rutter served as a law clerk for Chief Judge Charles P. Kocoras in the Northern
District of Illinois. He currently serves as a law clerk for Judge Samuel Der-Yeghiayan in
the Northern District. This article is dedicated to Judge Kocoras. I owe him a debt of
gratitude for being allowed to work with him over this past year and to gain invaluable
experience. Judge Kocoras is the epitome of what a judge should be: strong, fair,
compassionate, lighthearted, and honorable.
I. Contrary to what one might think, the protections of the Title VII discrimination
and retaliation sections are not exclusively given to lowly peons in employment that are
powerless. Mathur v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 207 F.3d 938, 944 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting
that the sections apply equally to all employees including "highly placed employees," such
as a president of a university).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The scope of this article shall be limited to disparate
treatment claims. It will not consider disparate impact claims which are brought under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b).
4. Due to the separate protection of retaliation, the Seventh Circuit has limited the
scope of equitable estoppel in the Title VII context where the plaintiff claims that he was
deterred from making a complaint because of threats from the employer. Shanoff v. Ill.
Dep't of Human Servs., 258 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2001).
5. Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 1998).
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retaliation against persons that oppose unlawful employment discrimination
or participate in an employment discrimination claim. 6 The retaliation
section of Title VII is becoming increasingly prominent in the federal
system. The number of Title VII discrimination cases continue to rise and
fill the federal court7 dockets and the number of claims alleging retaliation are
increasing as well.
This Article will explain the Seventh Circuit's body of Title VII law. It
will also discuss some of the complexities and unique nuances in the law
governing retaliation claims. Finally, it will address certain changes in the
law surrounding retaliation claims and conclude with proposals for the future
of the law in the retaliation context.
I.

PRESENT LAW IN THE RETALIATION CONTEXT

Title VII is a remedial statute that the courts interpret broadly.8 Its
purposes are to ensure equal employment opportunities, to remove barriers
that inhibit the advancement of protected classes, and to provide a remedy to
employees harmed by employment discrimination. 9 The anti-discrimination
section of Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer ...to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
[,] to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [his] race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."' 10 The anti-retaliation section of Title VII
states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment ...because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter. '1

6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See Heuer v. Weil-McLain, 203 F.3d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir.
2000) (noting that the "purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to prevent Title VII

claims from being deterred").
7. See Wendy Hyland, Equal Opportunity for Employers: Elevating the Adverse
Employment Action Standard to Allow Only Meritorious Retaliation Claims, 90 KY. L.J.
273, 276 (2002) (finding that retaliation cases went up 72% between 1992 and 1998).

There were approximately 7,900 retaliation cases filed in 1991, and in 1998, there were
31,059 retaliation cases filed. Id. See also Kari Jahnke, Protecting Employees from
Employees: Applying Title VII's Anti-Retaliation Provision to Coworker Harassment, 19
LAW & INEQ. 101, 126 n.172 (2001) (citing authority that between 1991 and 1997 the
number of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC went from 7,900 to 18,100). The years
1991 to 1997 saw a 300% increase in employment cases filed in federal district courts. Id.
See also Debra S. Katz & Alan R. Kabat, Retaliation in the Workplace, in ADVANCED
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 1, 4 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. eds., 2002) (noting that
retaliation claims constituted 15.3% of all charges filed with the EEOC in 1992 and
constituted 27.5% of all charges in 2001).
8. Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1996).

9. Id. at 889.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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The federal courts apply many of the same standards and procedures
for Title VII discrimination claims to retaliation claims. Thus, most of the
rules discussed in this article will generally be applicable to both retaliation
and discrimination claims.
To prove a retaliation claim a plaintiff has two paths she can follow: the
direct method or the indirect method. 12 To proceed under the direct method
a plaintiff must show through direct or circumstantial evidence that an
employer took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff because of
some impermissible bias.' 3 A plaintiff, however, will generally not have the
type of "smoking gun" evidence necessary to proceed under the direct
method. 14 Practitioners should not confuse the "direct method" with "direct
evidence," which is evidence that shows discrimination without the need for
any inference. 15 While direct evidence is likely sufficient for the direct
method, the Seventh Circuit
has stated that certain types of circumstantial
16
well.
as
suffice
evidence
A plaintiff will usually proceed under the indirect method employing a
modified version of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green's 17 burden shifting
method.' 8 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the indirect
method, a plaintiff employee must show that: (1) she engaged in an activity
protected under the statute; (2) her job performance met the legitimate
expectations of her employer; (3) her employer treated her less favorably
than similarly situated employees that did not engage in the protected
activity; and (4) her employer took a materially adverse employment action
against her.19 If a plaintiff establishes all the elements for a prima facie case,
the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.2 ° If the defending
employer provides a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, then the burden
12. Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2003).
13. Id.; Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir. 2003). See Fyfe v. City
of Fort Wayne, 241 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that direct evidence "usually
takes the form of an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent by the employer").
14. See Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chicago, 282 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that

there usually is not sufficient evidence to proceed under the direct method); Rogers, 320
F.3d at 753 (noting that admissions by the employer are rare).
15. Rogers, 320 F.3d at 753 (defining direct evidence as "evidence that.., would
prove the fact in question 'without reliance on inference or presumption"').
16. Haywood, 323 F.3d at 529 (permitting circumstantial evidence to show that the
employer's job action was motivated by race or national origin); Rogers, 320 F.3d at 754
(defining circumstantial evidence as "evidence that allows a jury to infer intentional
discrimination by the decisionmaker"); Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465 (stating that "an
employee may present direct or indirect evidence of [an] employer's retaliatory intent
[and] [d]irect evidence ... frequently does not exist").

17. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
18. Edward A. Marshall, Excluding Participationin Internal Complaint Mechanisms
From Absolute Retaliation Protection: Why Everyone, Including the Employer, Loses, 5
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP, POL'Y J. 549, 566 (2001). CompareHilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465

(outlining a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim) with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 , 802 (1973) (outlining a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim).
19. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465.
20. Id.
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shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's excuse is merely a
pretext for discrimination. 2' This Article will now discuss each aspect of a
Title VII claim in more detail, giving special attention to the material adverse
employment action element, an intensely debated element within the Seventh
Circuit and among the various other Circuits in the federal system.
A.

ProtectedActivity

Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees that oppose an
unlawful employment practice or participate in a discrimination claim.2 The
retaliation section is sometimes divided into the "opposition" clause and the
"participation" clause.2 3 A plaintiff commonly claims she was retaliated
against after she complained about discrimination2 4 or after she filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).25
Generally, the anti-retaliation section is applicable only if the employee
complained to her employer about unlawful discrimination because an
employer cannot retaliate if it is unaware of the employee's discrimination
complaint.26 Retaliation claims are not limited to employees affected by an
employer's original discriminatory action. Other parties may also file a
retaliation claim. For instance, if a co-worker comes forward and defends a
complaining employee, the co-worker may have a retaliation claim against
the employer if she suffers harm from the employer because of her
assistance.27

21. Id. See Worth v. Tyler, 276 F.3d 249, 265-66 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining
requirement to show pretext); Walker v. Glickman, 241 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2001)
(same).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
23. Speedy v. Rexnord Corp., 243 F.3d 397, 405-06 (noting the difference between
"opposition" conduct and "participation" conduct); Marshall, supra note 18, at 557-65
(discussing how courts distinguish between the "opposition" clause and the "participation"
clause). See, e.g., Worth, 276 F.3d at 265 (finding that plaintiff opposed discrimination
within the meaning of Title VII by filing a police report regarding an alleged sexual
assault). But see Johnson v. ITT Aerospace/Communications Div. of ITT Indus., Inc., 272
F.3d 498, 501 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "it is not actionable retaliation [if an employer]
discipline[s] an employee for "filing a frivolous charge against the employer"). See also
Moore v. Principi, No. 00 C 2975, 2003 WL 21281765, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2003)
(indicating that it is unsettled in the Seventh Circuit as to whether the reasonable and good
faith standard used for opposition clause claims is applicable to a participation clause
claim).
24. E.g., Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that
the plaintiff alleged her employer terminated her in retaliation for filing a grievance).
25. E.g., Spears v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. & Human Res., 210 F.3d 850, 852 (8th Cir.
2000) (noting that the plaintiff alleged her employer terminated her in retaliation of her
filing an EEOC complaint). Miller v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1008
(7th Cir. 2000),
26. Miller v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 997, 1008 (7th Cir. 2000).
27. Hermreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2002). See 42
U.S.C. § 20OOe-3(a) (stating that a co-worker falls within the literal language of the
retaliation section if he or she "participat[es] ... in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing" on behalf of a co-worker).
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B. Subsequent Improper Behaviorand Meeting an
Employer's Legitimate Expectations
An employee

is not "immunize[d] ...

from being subsequently

disciplined or terminated for inappropriate behavior" simply because the
employee filed a discrimination charge. 28 Likewise, Title VII should not tie
the hands of employers by making them unable to discipline or discharge an
employee that has a poor work performance. If an employee is not
adequately performing her job, then the employer has a legitimate reason to
discipline or discharge the employee and the employee should not get the
benefit of proceeding under the indirect method. 29 For the legitimate
expectations element, an employee's injury is based on how well the
employee was performing her job at the time that she suffered the adverse
employment action.3 ° The courts look unfavorably on self-serving affidavits
from employees as 31
the sole means to show that an employee performed her
work satisfactorily.
C. Being Treated Differently Than Similarly SituatedEmployees
A plaintiff must show that she was treated differently than similarly
situated employees that did not engage in the protected activity. 32 An
employee is similarly situated if "the employee is one who is 'directly
comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects."' 33 Where the plaintiff is

28. Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 276 F.3d 345, 359 (7th Cir. 2002). See Paluck v.
Gooding Rubber Co., 221 F.3d 1003 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the fact that an employee
files a discrimination charge against her employer it does not subsequently preclude the
employer from disciplining the employee for legitimate reasons).
29. See Buckner v. 111.Dep't of Children & Family Servs., No. 01 C 7329, 2003 WL
187408, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2003) (indicating that an employee should not be able to
use a retaliation claim to "immunize herself from adverse employment action despite poor
work performance, bad attitude, truancy, etc.").
30. Lang v. I11.Dep't of Children & Family Servs., No. 00 C 7581, 2003 WL
21147711, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2003). If the plaintiff is singled out for punishment
and other employees not within the selected class were not punished in a similar way the
question for the legitimate expectations element is whether the plaintiff was treated more
harshly than other employees that broke the same rule. Peters v. Renaissance Hotel
Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 2002) A prima facie case can also be made out
by showing that although similarly situated employees outside the protected class were
punished, they were not punished as severely as the plaintiff was. Peele v. Country Mut.
Ins. Co., 288 F.3d 319, 330 (7th Cir. 2002).
31. See Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 164 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting an
employee's self-serving statement is not sufficient to contradict an employer's accusation
of poor performance); Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 46 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1995)
(noting that a plaintiffs self-serving testimony is insufficient to call into doubt employers
evidence that plaintiff was terminated for legitimate reasons); Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev.
Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1460-61 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that generally self-serving statements
by employees concerning good work performance do not create a legitimate factual
dispute, but if an employee specifically refutes the deficiencies claimed by the employer
there may be a sufficient disputed issue to preclude summary judgment).
32. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465.
33. Rogers, 320 F.3d at 755 (quoting Grayson v. O'Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 819 (7th Cir.
2002)). See Shelvy v. Potter, 63 Fed. Appx. 273, 275 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished
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complaining about a disciplinary action by the employer, the Seventh Circuit
has required "a showing that two employees dealt with the same supervisor,
34
were subject to the same workplace rules, and engaged in similar conduct."
Although this element may seem to be a trivial issue, it can become a major
roadblock for a plaintiff under the indirect method if she cannot find a
similarly situated employee.
D. Pretext
Once an employer presents a non-discriminatory reason 35 for the
material adverse employment action, the burden shifts to the employee to
show that the employer's reason is a pretext. 36 To establish pretext, the
plaintiff must show that the employer's explanation is "not worthy of
belief. 3 7 The plaintiff can show pretext by establishing that "(1) the
defendant's explanation has no basis in fact, or (2) the explanation was not
the real reason, or (3) [ ] the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the
termination.
A pretext means that the employer intentionally lied;
evidence, therefore, that shows that an employer's reason for terminating the
employee was 39incorrect, imprudent, or a mistake is irrelevant to the pretext
determination.

E. MaterialAdverse Employment Action
A plaintiff must also show that the employer took a material adverse
employment action against her. 40 However, the courts have recognized that
Title VII should not become involved in every minor dispute in the
workplace. By narrowing or broadening the definition of what constitutes an
"adverse employment action" the courts can limit the scope of Title VII. 4I

opinion) (stating that comparison can be made in terms of performance, qualifications, and
conduct).
34. Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 324 F.3d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 2003).
35. E.g., Velasco v. I11.
Dep't of Human Servs., 246 F.3d 1010, 1017 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the termination of physician is that
the physician's conduct endangered patients).
36. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465.
37. Sanchez v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1999); Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at
364.
38. Worth, 276 F.3d at 266 (quoting Sanchez, 188 F.3d at 746). See Walker, 241 F.3d
at 889 (stating that pretext can be established by "suggesting that retaliation was the most
likely motive for the failure to hire, or by showing that the defendant's proffered reason
was not worthy of belief").
39. Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 730 (7th Cir. 2001); Logan v. Kautex
Textron N. Am., 259 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2001); Miller v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 203
F.3d 997, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 2000).
40. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465. Although an employer is prohibited from taking an
adverse action against an employee, the Seventh Circuit has found that an employer can
bribe an employee in order to get the employee to voluntarily choose not to file a
discrimination claim. Cullom v. Brown, 209 F.3d 1035, 1041 (7th Cir. 2000).
41. See Sweeney v. West, 149 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the adverse
employment action element is utilized to limit cases that are severe "enough to prompt a
federal case"). It should be noted that narrowing the scope of the definition of an adverse
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The Seventh Circuit has stated more than once that it is not the role of courts
to become "super-personnel departments" that evaluate an employer's every
decision.42 Courts have thus tried to limit their interference with employers'
management of personnel and their enforcement of discipline and workplace
rules. 3 Courts limit the definition of "disability" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) 44 in a similar manner, in that it does not encompass
every physical or mental discomfort or ailment. 45 In regards to Title VII, by
striking a balance in the definition of an adverse employment action, courts
can provide protection to employees while allowing employers some
freedom to run their businesses without fearing lawsuits at every tum. 46 The
Circuits employ
several different standards for the adverse employment
47
action element.
In the Seventh Circuit, a plaintiff must show that her employer took an
adverse employment action against her.4 8 The adverse employment action
must be material,49 meaning it is "more than 'a mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities.' 50 A material adverse employment action
is described as "a tangible change in working conditions that produces a
material disadvantage.., and [a] change[] in employment that significantly
affect[s] an employee's future career prospects.",51 An adverse employment
action is not material simply because it makes an employee unhappy, 52 or
because the complaining employee is overly irritable or has a chip on her
employment action would limit the overall number of claims. However, in some cases
where the plaintiff clearly suffered a material adverse employment action, such as
termination, this element is a non-issue and the element's ultimate definition will have
little relevance.
42. Grayson, 308 F.3d at 820; Chiaramonte v. Fashion Bed Group, Inc., 129 F.3d 391,
400 (7th Cir. 1997).
43. Jahnke, supra note 7, at 124.
44. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000).
45. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195-201 (2002) (defining
what constitutes a major life activity and concluding that a plaintiff is not disabled merely
because the plaintiff cannot perform specific skills necessary for the plaintiff's job).
46. Hyland, supra note 7, at 274.
47. See Katz & Kabat, supra note 7, at 14-15 (discussing the standards various Circuits
use); Tod F. Schleier, Recent Cases and Developments in the Law of Retaliation, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS N FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS 207, 214-219 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. eds., 2002) (discussing the split in the Circuits); Joel
A. Kravetz, Deterrence v. MaterialHarm: Finding the AppropriateStandardto Define an
"Adverse Action" in Retaliation Claims Brought Under the Applicable Equal Employment

Opportunity Statutes, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315, 321-55 (2002) (discussing the
standards applied in each Circuit); Linda M. Glover, Title VII Section 704(a) Retaliation
Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward Justice, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 577, 594-609 (2001)
(discussing the standards that different Circuits apply).
48. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465.

49. Id.;
Ribando v. United Airlines, Inc., 200 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 1999).
50. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465 (quoting Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)); Ribando, 200 F.3d at 510 (quoting Crady, 993
F.2d at 136).
51. Spears, 210 F.3d at 853.
52. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 466; Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.

1996).
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53

shoulder.

However, due to the unique set of circumstances in each Title VII case,
the Seventh Circuit has refrained from providing a list of material adverse
employment actions.5 4 Some possible examples of material adverse
employment actions in the Seventh Circuit are: termination, demotion,
material decrease in pay or benefits, and a material decrease in status,
prestige, or responsibilities. 5 Although a material adverse employment
action does not have to be "quantifiable in terms of pay or benefits, 56
actions that cause economic harm to a plaintiff are more likely to be
considered materially adverse employment actions. 57 Some cases in the
Seventh Circuit take a narrow view of an adverse employment action and
require that the action be "accompanied by some other action, such as a job
loss or demotion." 58 Generally, some actions are insufficient alone to
constitute a materially adverse employment action, such as poor performance
evaluations59 or the denial of a discretionary bonus. 60 However, other
actions alone may constitute an adverse employment action, such as an
6
employer encouraging employees to act adversely to another employee. 1
53. Smart, 89 F.3d at 441.
54. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465. See Knox v. Ind., 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "adverse actions can come in many shapes and sizes").
55. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465-66 (quoting Ribando, 200 F.3d at 510); Rabinovitz v.
Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 488 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d
1080, 1086 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "an 'adverse employment action' alters the 'terms
or conditions' of one's employment"); Baker v. Henderson, No. 99-2660, 2000 WL
767846, at *6 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "a dramatic downward shift in skill level
required to perform job responsibilities can constitute [an] adverse employment action");
Crady, 993 F.2d 132 (indicating that changing an employee's title to a less impressive title
or a significant reduction in responsibilities might be a material adverse employment
action). But see Stutler, 263 F.3d at 702 (noting that "a lateral transfer without a loss in
benefits does not constitute an adverse employment action); Hoffman-Dombrowski v.
Arlington Int'l Racecourse, Inc., 254 F.3d 644, 654 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that "changing
[an employee's] schedule, secretly videotaping her" and reprimanding her for allowing
unauthorized persons in her office were not materially adverse employment actions);
Ribando, 200 F.3d at 511 (finding that a letter expressing concern about the employee put
in the employee's personnel file did not constitute an adverse employment action);
Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456-558 (7th Cir.1994) (finding that a lateral
transfer and change in title was not an adverse employment action).
56. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 466.
57. See Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
a material adverse employment action can be non-economical).
58. Krause v. City of La Cross, 246 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a
letter of reprimand is not an adverse employment action by itself); See Katz & Kabat,
supra note 7, at 13-14 (stating that Krause applies the ultimate employment decision
standard used by some Circuits).
59. Spears, 210 F.3d at 854 (holding that "a poor performance rating does not in itself
constitute an adverse employment action"); Sweeney, 149 F.3d at 556 (noting that the
Circuit does not conclude that a negative performance evaluation alone constitutes an
adverse employment action). See also Krause, 246 F.3d at 1000 (holding that a letter of
reprimand alone is insufficient to qualify as an adverse employment action).
60. Rabinovitz, 89 F.3d at 488-89 (concluding that the denial of a bonus alone is not an
adverse employment action when a bonus is not automatic).
61. See McKenzie v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 485 (7th Cir. 1994) (indicating
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F.

Unique Aspects of Retaliation Claims

It is not uncommon for a plaintiff to bring both a discrimination claim
and a retaliation claim. 62 For example, a plaintiff may allege in one claim
that his or her employer discriminated against her, and then bring a separate
retaliation claim if the employer retaliated against her because she filed a
charge of discrimination.
If it is later determined that the plaintiffs
discrimination claim is deficient because her employer did not engage in
63
unlawful discrimination, the plaintiff can still pursue her retaliation claim.
However, the plaintiff must show that she reasonably, and in good faith,
64
believed that she was challenging conduct that violated Title VII.
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has held that if a plaintiff bases her claim
on an incorrect belief that she is a member of a class protected under Title
VII, then the plaintiff cannot have a reasonable belief that she is challenging
65
conduct that is a violation of Title VII.
The Seventh Circuit recognizes that the adverse action, in the
retaliation context, taken against the employee need not be an employment
action.66 For instance, an employee complains about discrimination and is
contemplating filing a complaint. Her employer visits her house during the
night and throws a brick through her window, in effect, sending her a
message. This scenario would fall within the retaliation section of the Title
VII. 67 In this sense, a retaliation claim is broader than a discrimination
claim, because it is not limited to situations where there is an adverse
employment action. 68
Practitioners should remember this aspect of
retaliation caselaw because courts continue to refer to the adverse action
69
required for retaliation claims as an adverse employment action.
that in theory if an employer orders co-workers to shun a fellow employee it could
possibly constitute a material adverse employment action).
62. E.g., Oest v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 240 F.3d 605, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that
the plaintiff alleged that her employer discriminated against her based on race and that her
retaliated against her for filing a charge with the EEOC).
63. Fine v. Ryan tnt'l Airlines, 305 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2002); Dey, 28 F.3d at
1458.
64. Fine, 305 F.3d at 752; Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224
F.3d 701, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2000); Pasqua v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 518 (7th
Cir. 1996); Dey, 28 F.3d at 1458.
65. Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 707 (7th Cir.
2000).
66. Herrnreiter,315 F.3d at 746 (noting that "shooting a person for filing a complaint
of discrimination would be an effective method of retaliation"); Schobert, 304 F.3d 733
(noting that brick-throwing and tire-slashing are methods of retaliation); Aviles v. Cornell
Forge Co., 183 F.3d 598, 606 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that giving a false report to police
about an individual pursuing a discrimination claim is a retaliatory action). Compare 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (making specific reference to employment action such as hiring and
firing an employee) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (containing broader language prohibiting
all acts of discrimination taken against an employee in retaliation).
67. Schobert, 304 F.3d at 733. See Herrnreiter, 315 F.3d at 746 (indicating that
shooting a person for filing a complaint would be a form of retaliation).
68. Herrnreiter,315 F.3d at 746. See supra note 66 (comparing actions prohibited
under the discrimination and retaliation sections of Title Vtl).
69. E.g., Haywood v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 323 F.3d 524, 531 (7th Cir. 2003)

The John MarshallLaw Review

[36:925

Recently, the Seventh Circuit ruled on an issue limited solely to the
retaliation section of Title VII. In Twisdale v. Snow, 70 an employee
participated in an internal discrimination investigation on the side of the
employer, and sought protection under Title VII's anti-retaliation
provisions. 71 The section states that an employer shall not retaliate against
an employee that "participated in any manner in an investigation." 72 A
literal reading seems to suggest that the section protects an employee whose
actions assist her employer.73 The Twisdale court rejected this interpretation,
stating, "[p]erverse and absurd statutory interpretations are not to be adopted
in the name of literalism. '74 Consequently, the Court held that the employee
was not protected under Title VII. 75 The court noted that Title VII was
created for the protection of those that are discriminated against and those
that assist them, not employees who assist their employer in investigating a
76
claim.
Special issues can arise when retaliation is threatened before an
employee complains about discrimination or if an employee waits too long to
complain about retaliation. The Seventh Circuit has ruled that a retaliation
claim can be based on anticipatory retaliation when the employer threatens
retaliation.77 Plaintiffs generally cannot base a retaliation claim upon
employer conduct that occurred after the employee was terminated.78
However, post-termination conduct by an employer can be the basis for a
claim if the conduct "impinges on [the plaintiffs]
future employment
79
prospects or otherwise has a nexus to employment."
II.

THE CHALLENGES AND PITFALLS FOR RETALIATION CLAIMS
NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

Discrimination in the workplace can take a variety of forms, thus it is
difficult to fashion hard and fast rules that will adequately guide courts in all
situations. Additionally, the type of conduct sufficient to invoke the ire of
Title VII protection or constitute actionable retaliation is a continually
evolving concept. As social and cultural norms change, the definition of
(indicating that a plaintiff must show that she suffered an "adverse employment action" to
establish a prima facie case for retaliation). See also Rogers, 320 F.3d at 754-55 (referring
to an adverse employment action); Stutler v. 111.
Dep't of Corrs., 263 F.3d 698, 702-03 (7th
Cir. 2001) (referring to an adverse employment action).
70. 325 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2003).
71. Twisdale, 325 F.3d at 952.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
73. Twisdale, 325 F.3d at 953.
74. Id. at 953.
75. Id. at 952-53.
76. Id.
77. Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002). But see
Johnson, 272 F.3d at 501 (holding that "it is not actionable retaliation [if an employer]
discipline[s] an employee for "filing a frivolous charge against the employer").

78. Koelsch, 46 F.3d at 709.
79. Veprinsky, 87 F.3d at 891. But see Ishkhanian v. Forrester Clinic S.C., No. 02 C
9339, 2003 WL 21479072, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2003) (noting that Veprinsky does not
make it clear whether an action must have a nexus to employment).
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acceptable conduct may change as well. Consequently, Title VII caselaw
must adapt to changing social norms. For example, in the Title VII
discrimination context, one consideration when determining whether a
plaintiff has established a hostile work environment claim is the social
context in which the conduct occurred. 80 The retaliation section of Title VII
includes only general language precluding "discrimination" against those
that oppose unlawful conduct or participate in a complaint. 81 The courts
have struggled with interpreting this section and often disagree with each
other. 82 The retaliation section is a unique beast because of its special
language and purpose. Thus this section has been a challenge for the
Seventh Circuit, and its nuances may present pitfalls for the unwary
practitioner.
A.

MirrorImage of DiscriminationPrinciples

Courts historically utilized many of the same principles and concepts,
such as the McDonnell Douglass burden shifting procedure for retaliation
and discrimination claims.83 In Stone v. City of Indianapolis Public
Utilities, 4 the Seventh Circuit announced that the same four prima facie
elements used for discrimination claims should be applied to retaliation
claims. 85 Prior to Stone, for a prima facie case, a plaintiff had to show that:
(1) she engaged in a protected activity, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) there was a causal nexus between adverse action
and the protected activity. 86 Stone removed the causation element from a
plaintiffs prima facie case in a retaliation claim.87
Since the prima facie elements are the same for both discrimination
cases and retaliation cases, one might presume that caselaw relating to each
type of action is interchangeable. Such a presumption is encouraged by the
fact that other discrimination statutes, such as the ADA, utilize the Title VII
principles and the same elements for a prima facie case.88 Also, retaliation is
a subset of discrimination. Consequently, it is common for courts to apply
ADA and ADEA case law interchangeably with Title VII discrimination and
retaliation claims and vice-versa. 89 However, one must be cautious when

80. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at463.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
82. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing the split among the Circuits).
83. Haywood, 323 F.3d at 529, 531 (applying the McDonnell Douglas burden shift
analysis to a Title VII discrimination claim and a retaliation claim).
84. 281 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2002).
85. Stone, 281 F.3d at 644 (defining a prima facie case for retaliation).
86. McClendon v. Ind. Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1997).
87. Stone, 281 F.3d at 644.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000) (adopting the remedies, rights, and procedures of

Title VII for ADA claims); Perice v. City of Chicago, No. 99 C 4441, 2000 WL 224639,
*3 (N.D. 111.
Feb. 22, 2000) (noting that Title I of the ADA "explicitly adopts the
remedies, rights and procedures of Title VII").
89. E.g., Haywood, 323 F.3d at 531-32 (citing Crady, an ADEA case, in ruling on Title
VII claims); Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1084-86 (citing Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788

(7th Cir. 1999), an ADA case, in ruling on Title VII claims).
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one applies case law from other types of claims in the retaliation context.
Beware, things may not be as simple as they seem. The Seventh
Circuit recently sent out a warning in dicta in Herrnreiter v. Chicago
Housing Authority.9° Herrnreiteraddressed a discrimination claim and cited
retaliation cases for new law concerning the material adverse employment
action element. 91 The Court noted that it did not intend to imply that an
adverse employment action in the discrimination context is identical to an
adverse action in the retaliation context, 92 because the adverse action in the
retaliation context is actually the broader of the two. 93 The Court found that
some cases incorrectly presume that the adverse actions required for
discrimination and retaliation claims are the same 94 and hypothesized that the
courts disregarded any distinction between retaliation and discrimination
claims in order to simplify matters. 95
Herrnreiter criticized this
simplification and called for a more liberal standard for retaliation claims
because it only takes a minor adverse action on the part of an employer to
dissuade co-workers from coming
forward to support an employee
96
complaining about discrimination.
B.

What Remains of the CausationElement?

In Stone, the Seventh Circuit concluded that a plaintiff need not show a
causal connection between the adverse employment action and the plaintiff
engaging in the protected activity. 97 Some Seventh Circuit cases, however,
disregard Stone on the causation element, 98 but otherwise accept Stone's
general authority. 99 What is the significance then of the volumes of caselaw
elaborating on the causation element? The causation element is still an
important aspect in proving a Title VII claim under the direct method.100
One common issue addressed in relation to the former causation
element is whether a temporal separation between the protected activity and
the adverse action allegedly taken against the employee in retaliation
precludes or advances a showing of causation.' 0' A consideration of the time
90. 315 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2002)
91. Herrnreiter,315 F.3d at 745.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 745-46. But see Murray v. Chicago Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 880, 890 (7th
Cir. 2001) (equating the analysis for the retaliation claim with the analysis employed for
the adverse employment action element of the discrimination claim).
94. Herrnreiter,315 F.3d at 745-46.

95. Id. at 746.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. See also Justin P. O'Brien,
Weighing Temporal Proximity in Title VII Retaliation Claims, 43 B.C. L. REV. 741, 748

(2002) (indicating that the causation element is the most widely litigated element and the
lynchpin of a retaliation claim).
98. See Rogers, 320 F.3d at 755 (mentioning cases that disregard Stone).

99. Id.
100. See Haywood, 323 F.3d at 531 (requiring a casual connection between a protected

activity and an employment action to establish a prima facie case for retaliation under the
direct method).
101. Velasco, 246 F.3d at 1018; Oest, 240 F.3d at 616; Sweeney, 149 F.3d at 556-57;
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between the protected action and the adverse action is still relevant for the
pretext issue. As previously mentioned, to prove pretext a plaintiff must
show that the employer's reason is unworthy of credence. 10 2 The shorter the
period of time between the protected activity and the alleged retaliation, the
more likely it is that the employer is not telling the truth. Therefore,
although the causation element caselaw is no longer directly on point, the
analysis in those cases could still be instructive when analyzing the pretext
issue. 10 3 The Seventh Circuit has cautioned against placing too much
emphasis on timing arguments in the pretext context because it can lead to
impermissible speculation as to the employer's motive,'0 4 but timing is still a
valid consideration for the pretext inquiry.
C. The CompetingInterests
The law governing retaliation claims must be balanced, taking into
consideration the interests of employees and employers. An employer must
be able to function, manage its employees and discipline or discharge its
employees without constantly fearing liability. 0 5 If, for instance, an
employee is not meeting the legitimate expectations of her employer, the
employer should not be required to retain the employee simply because she
has complained about discrimination. Unfortunately, the retaliation section
of Title VII may serve as a crutch for such poor workers because employers
will hesitate to risk potential liability.
The employees' interests must also be considered as well. Employers
are made up of human beings and often perceive a complaint against them as
an attack; it is human nature to seek revenge when one is attacked.
Employers must be inhibited from utilizing their power over employees to
further such intentions. The retaliation provision must encourage employers
and employees to adjudicate disputes concerning employment discrimination
in accordance with the provisions of Title VII. Retaliation continues to
occur in the workplace, despite Title VII. Studies have shown only a small
percentage of women who experience sexual harassment report it and most
women who do not report it fear retaliation. 0 6 Additionally, studies have
shown that a significant percentage of women that voice their complaints
meet reprisals of some sort, such as denial of promotions or lower
performance evaluations.'0 7
D. Proposalsfor the Future
The Seventh Circuit should strive to ensure that the law in the

McClendon, 108 F.3d at 796-97; Dey, 28 F.3d at 1458.
102. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Alexander v. Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs., 263 F.3d 673 (7th
Cir. 2001) (using the timing of the employer's actions in analyzing pretext discrimination).
104. See Sanchez, 188 F.3d at 747 n.4 (noting that speculation of an employer's timing
is insufficient alone to create an issue of fact).
105. Hyland, supra note 7, at 274.
106. Marshall, supra note 18, at 586-87.
107. Id. at 587.
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retaliation context is more clearly defined. Discrimination is a vague,
illusive concept. Retaliation and discrimination comes in all shapes and
sizes, but if the law on retaliation has more concrete boundaries, employers
and employees alike will benefit. Employers need to be able to spend less
time and effort considering the ramifications of disciplining or terminating
an employee. Employers will also be more reluctant to take retaliatory
actions against an employee if they know with a degree of certainty, that they
cannot defend themselves in court.
Clarity in the law will also lessen the filing of meritless claims by
plaintiffs, also benefiting employers and employees. Employers benefit
because they do not need to address meritless suits. Plaintiffs benefit
because they do not waste time pursuing meritless claims and risk paying
filing fees and risk being billed for costs if the case is dismissed. Litigation
as a whole decreases when the law is clear,
because the employer better
08
understands which conduct is proscribed. 1
Clarity is especially essential in the Title VII discrimination and
retaliation context because of the emotional aspects of such cases. A
person's job is closely connected to all aspects of her life. It affects her
income and free time and indirectly impacts her family and outside activities.
A person often sees her job as part of who she is as a person. Thus, when a
person is disciplined or demoted or fired there is going to be an emotional
component. That emotion can lead plaintiffs to sue without regard to the
merit of their claim. Where the law is unclear in the Title VII context and
thus plaintiffs are offered even an outside chance of success, the emotional
reaction by plaintiffs may drive them to file suits. Retaliation claims are
often even more emotionally charged situations because not only has the
employer allegedly taken some adverse action against the employee, the
employer has also taken a second adverse action against the employee and in
the plaintiffs eyes has figuratively thumbed its nose at the plaintiffs initial
complaint.
One aspect of the caselaw that should be clarified is what is a similarly
situated employee. The "similar" within the element verbiage can make a
prediction by employers or employees as to what is a similarly situated
employee a risky venture. The caselaw, which tends to expand "a similar
employee" to "an employee that is similar in material aspects" does little to
clear up the vagueness of the element. Although the rules envision similarly
situated employees and not necessarily employees in the exact same position,
some efforts should be made to tighten up the rule. The rules can try and
address common factors, such as job description, type of work, work
location, title and supervisor. At the very least efforts could be made to
isolate situations where an employee is almost always going to be a similarly
situated employee and thus clarify the amorphous concept of a similarly
situated employee.
In regards to material adverse employment actions, courts in the
Seventh Circuit currently refrain from providing a "laundry list" of material

108. Jahnke, supra note 7, at 126 n.174.
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adverse employment actions partly because the number is potentially
limitless. 1°9 However, one way to clarify the material adverse employment
action element would be to weigh in on the employment actions mentioned
as examples. For example, it is safe to say that a termination, demotion, and
a denial of a promotion are material adverse employment actions.'10 A
material reduction in wages, salary, or benefits usually also constitute a
material adverse employment action. One needs a creative imagination to
construct a fact pattern in which a termination does not constitute a material
adverse employment action. Yet such a determination is technically still
open. In this situation, a court would be justified in creating a limited
exception based on the unusual facts. More problematic actions that come to
mind are transfers, alterations in working conditions, alterations in job
responsibilities and loss of prestige or change of title.
If the Seventh Circuit intends to carve out a specific definition for the
adverse employment action element in the retaliation context, it should be
created anew and applied exclusively in the retaliation context. The rule
should not build upon past definitions. Title VII speaks in general language
about prohibiting discrimination, and courts interpret Title VII's language as
providing the elements for the prima facie case. The Seventh Circuit has
held that adverse employment action must be material, and has held that the
scope of what is an adverse employment action in the retaliation is broader
than in the discrimination context. If the definition for an adverse action in
the retaliation context is melded into the discrimination claim definition,
courts will be put in a quandary. For a retaliation claim, courts will have to
determine what kind of an employment action is material, yet not as material
as a discrimination claim, but is sufficiently severe to dissuade persons from
exercising their rights under Title VII.
Clearly the concerns articulated in Herrnreiterare important.11 The
retaliation section is not a carbon copy of the anti-discrimination section. It
has unique language and serves a unique purpose. Therefore, the procedures
of Title VII discrimination claims should not be blindly applied in the
retaliation context for the sake of simplicity. The anti-retaliation section is
the guardian for the anti-discrimination section, which is the heart of Title
VII. Thus, the courts must ensure that the anti-retaliation section serves its
purpose. If the courts engage in a cookie-cutter approach for retaliation
claims, the courts will not be able to take into consideration the special
concerns and interests surrounding each claim.
Finally, as the caselaw in the Title VII retaliation context is clarified
one additional simple suggestion would be to notify prospective plaintiffs

109. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334.

110. Hilt-Dyson, 282 F.3d at 465-66 (stating that "materially adverse actions may
include 'termination of employment, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits,
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a

particular situation"'); Worth, 276 F.3d at 265 (stating that "there is no question that
termination constitutes an adverse action under Title VII").
11. See Herrnreiter,315 F.3d at 746 (discussing concerns associated with applying the
same set of rules for both types of discrimination claims).
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about Title VII. An effort by the courts should be made to create handbooks
that explain the general aspects of Title VII law and which offers some way
that the readers can be made aware of changes in the law. The handbook
might also wam plaintiffs that if they are unsuccessful, they could be
charged for the defendant's costs. Such costs may not be negligible,
particularly for an out-of-work pro se plaintiff, and can become substantial
if, for example, several depositions are taken and transcripts are ordered.
These handbooks would be helpful to limit the amount of Title VII
discrimination and retaliation claims. If employees are made aware that their
situation is not sufficient for a claim then they will be less likely to sue for
discrimination or to include a retaliation claim in their action. Even if the
handbook limited the number of claims included in each Title VII case, they
would be useful because the courts and opposing parties would have fewer
issues to address. The handbook will help employees make an informed
decision as to whether to file discrimination, or a retaliation claim, and may
persuade them not to contact an attorney and embroil both sides in a lawsuit.
III. CONCLUSION
Title VII retaliation claims are a unique breed. They are closely related
to discrimination claims and adopt many of the same rules and procedures
that are used for discrimination claims. However, a retaliation claim is
unique in several ways and practitioners must understand those differences.
There has been movement in the Seventh Circuit toward unifying retaliation
and discrimination claims for the sake of simplicity, but there are also
indications that the Seventh Circuit may take a step back from the cookie
cutter approach. Title VII caselaw needs to be clarified and addressed apart
from Title VII discrimination so that the unique aspect of retaliation claims
can be addressed. Although the anti-discrimination section of Title VII is
more well known, the anti-retaliation section must not be forgotten. It serves
as an important guardian to ensure that the anti-discrimination section of
Title VII operates as intended and thus provides the workplace protections
that we have all come to expect in a civilized and enlightened society.

